THE BEHAVIOR OF TAXPAYERS AND THE OPTIMAL STRATEGY OF THE TAX AUDIT
Abstract
He article deals with the solution of the problem of tax evasion on the basis of determining the optimal strategy of tax audit in which the fiscal authority, with a limited budget, decides on the redistribution of resources between tax audits and improvement of the information system of reporting and analysis. The results of the simulation show that the investing in the modernization of the information system of tax administration is advisable in cases where the tax authority has limited inancial resources, but only to the extent that marginal costs to improve the quality of signals from taxpayers do not exceed the return on investments in the increase in the number of tax audits.
About the Authors
Vladimir Molodykh
North-Caucasus Federal University
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
Andrey Rubezhnoy
North-Caucasus Federal University
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
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Review
For citations:
Molodykh V., Rubezhnoy A. THE BEHAVIOR OF TAXPAYERS AND THE OPTIMAL STRATEGY OF THE TAX AUDIT. Newsletter of North-Caucasus Federal University. 2018;(3):94-100. (In Russ.)
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