Tax regulation of foreign trade operations in the system of international customs relationsTax regulation of foreign trade operations in the system of international customs relations
https://doi.org/10.37493/2307-907X.2022.1.3
Abstract
The article considers the possibilities of tax regulation of foreign trade operations through the use of customs and tariff regulation within the framework of supranational integration associations on the example of the Eurasian Economic Union. A model is proposed for constructing an optimal tariff policy of the countries participating in integration associations, taking into account the political and economic components of long-term targets for their development based on three groups of factors: state regulation, import tariff and integration effect. The results confirmed that the customs tariff policy is an effective tool for regulating foreign trade and its effect is enhanced within the framework of supranational integration associations, and tariff differentiation between importers is the optimal policy for the state, which aims to protect national markets and increase the competitiveness of domestic producers in global markets.
About the Author
A. S. Belyaev
Federal Customs Service
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
Belyaev Andrey Stanislavovich, applicants of the Department of Customs, Service and Tourism of NCFU, Head of the Sakhalin Customs of the Far Eastern Customs Administration
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Review
For citations:
Belyaev A.S. Tax regulation of foreign trade operations in the system of international customs relationsTax regulation of foreign trade operations in the system of international customs relations. Newsletter of North-Caucasus Federal University. 2022;1(1):23-30. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.37493/2307-907X.2022.1.3
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