BUDGETARY FEDERALISM AND TAX EVASION: ASSESSMENT AT A SUBNATIONAL LEVEL
Abstract
Assessment of the impact of fiscal policy on taxpayers' choice of tax evasion strategy in the context of their perception of vertical justice, the efficiency of budget expenditures of the state and the redistribution of tax revenues in the context of subnational budgets is presented. The simulation results showed that taxpayers consider tax evasion as a process coordinated to a certain extent with the state, which has a compensatory effect and allows to reduce the level of social tension in depressed regions. The leveling of the marginal utility rate of tax revenues received at the subnational level will allow for a more equitable redistribution of tax revenues by the levels of the budget system and will have a positive impact on the level of tax discipline.
About the Authors
Vladimir Molodykh
North-Caucasus Federal University
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
Vadim Sarkisov
North-Caucasus Federal University
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
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Review
For citations:
Molodykh V., Sarkisov V. BUDGETARY FEDERALISM AND TAX EVASION: ASSESSMENT AT A SUBNATIONAL LEVEL. Newsletter of North-Caucasus Federal University. 2018;(6):119-125. (In Russ.)
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